

Why do organizations take political stances? A review of reasons and risks

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Funding information

Templeton World Charity Foundation; Institute for Humane Studies, George Mason University; Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada

Abstract

Organizations and their leaders have begun publicly signaling political values in candidate endorsements, statements, and advertisements, yet political action often has negative organizational consequences, including lower public support, financial costs, and reduced trust. We review the costs of organizational politicization, moderators of those costs (such as ideological alignment and size of the organization), and potential reasons why leaders take political action. Scholars often attribute political action to public pressure to “take a stand”, but this public pressure may be misunderstood. Members of the public who want organizations to take political stances desire particular stances to be made in particular ways, tend to believe in the superiority of their own values, and are relatively likely to boycott businesses for political reasons. Catering to these individuals could lead to the accumulation of supporters who are especially politically zealous and likely to punish perceived political missteps. Demands to “take a stand” might seem like one unified call to action, but they may instead be a large set of directly conflicting demands. We make recommendations for future research to better understand leaders' reasons for political action and when, if ever, such actions support the interests of organizations and broader society.

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KEYWORDS

corporate political advocacy, institutional politicization, leader decision-making, organizational politicization, polarization, political advertisements, public trust

1 | INTRODUCTION

Organizations are increasingly “taking sides” on political controversies by issuing statements, endorsing political policies or candidates, infusing political values into advertisements, or otherwise signaling the political commitments of their organization (e.g., Chatterji & Toffel, 2018; Lin, 2022; Phillips, 2023; Soergel, 2016). For a few examples, *Goya Foods* CEO praised Trump and then subsequently selected Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez as “employee of the month” for a sales spike that followed her criticism (Behrmann, 2020), the academic journals *Nature*, *Scientific American*, and *Lancet* explicitly endorsed Joe Biden for president (Zhang, 2023), companies such as *Hobby Lobby* and *Papa John's* make campaign contributions to Republican candidates (Rehman, 2022), *Chick-fil-A* donated to organizations that opposed same-sex marriage (Garfield, 2018), and numerous major corporations, universities, and other institutions announced support for the Black Lives Matter movement and regularly partake in LGBTQ + Pride activities (Foss & Klein, 2023).

Such political actions may allow organizations to create meaningful change on the issues stakeholders care about most. And in at least some cases, these actions can contribute to the financial success of an organization by attracting attention and signaling value alignment with potential customers or by supporting causes essential to an organization's success (such as when corporations lobby for organizationally beneficial policies). However, emerging research at the intersection of social and personality psychology, organizational behavior, and marketing suggests that, alongside potential benefits, political action can also bring significant costs for organizations and institutions, and even for entire industries. In the present paper, we review two lines of emerging inquiry and highlight future directions surrounding these two questions:

1. What are the costs of organizational politicization?
2. Given these costs, why do organizational leaders take political action?

Table 1 below defines key constructs.

2 | ON RISKS

The recent history of well-known political brand campaigns create the impression that making political statements is a gamble for organizations—akin to searching for pots of gold buried in a minefield. Contrast *Pepsi's* “tone deaf” and widely derided ad perceived as trivializing police brutality (Victor, 2017) and *Bud Light's* polarizing and costly endorsement of transgender influencer Dylan Mulvaney (Holpuch, 2023) to *Ben & Jerry's* numerous successful campaigns aligned with progressive values (with some political actions seeming to cause temporary but not clearly long-term costs (Karaahmetovic, 2023)) and *Nike's* hugely successful and lucrative endorsement of racial justice activist Colin Kaepernick (Rizvi, 2018). Signaling support for one side in an ongoing sociopolitical controversy often appears polarizing, increasing commitment among some members of the public and alienating others. In best case scenarios, the former group far outweighs the latter, and taking political action not only contributes to the cause in question (presumably one of importance to organizational leaders), but also has positive organizational outcomes.

TABLE 1 Definitions of key constructs.

Construct	Definition
Organizational political action	Any public action—undertaken by businesses, nonprofits, or other organized groups—that signals commitment to a particular political candidate, party, policy, or perspective (e.g., issuing statements, publicly endorsing political candidates or policies, displaying political values in advertisements, posting content on social media that signals political values). Note that different types of political action will have different costs and benefits
Organizational politicization	Political values influencing an organization's work
Perceived politicization	Public perceptions that political values influence an organization's work
Costs	Outcomes that generally would be regarded as negative (e.g., financial losses, loss of public trust or support, reputational damage)

But it is not clear whether this best-case scenario characterizes the modal case of organizational political action—it might be the exception rather than the rule.

Large-scale analyses of the financial and social impacts of organizational political action tend to focus on commercial organizations that sell goods or services to the public, but for this subset of organizations, an emerging body of research suggests that political action is—at least in terms of short-term brand support and firm valuation—generally negative (e.g., Bhagwat et al., 2020; Klosterman et al., 2022; Mukherjee & Althuizen, 2020). On average, more is lost than gained. There are, however, numerous moderators to these negative outcomes, including characteristics of the organization, its stakeholders, its customers, and the type and timing of political action taken. For example, research has found that corporate political advocacy events (such as political advertisements or public statements) had a particularly negative effect on consumer brand perceptions when the advocacy appeared highly effortful (sometimes triggering online protests); however, the negative effects were weaker if multiple brands engaged in similar advocacy around the same time (Klosterman et al., 2022). An analysis of 293 corporate socio-political activism events found that these events caused negative stock market reactions and reduced firm value on average, but had less negative outcomes when the activism was more aligned with stakeholders' values and appeared less costly for the organization (Bhagwat et al., 2020). Similarly, brand support of BLM on social media generally had a negative impact on consumer responses (such as likes and follows), but this relationship was attenuated among brands with socially oriented missions, brands with a history of posting activist content, and brands with mostly Democratic customers (Wang et al., 2022).

In general, people's reactions to companies' political statements tend to depend on whether they agree with the political statement (i.e., they are ideologically aligned) or oppose it (i.e., they are ideologically misaligned). Negative reactions are typically weaker when the political action is ideologically aligned with the evaluator of that action (e.g., Bravo & Lee, 2019; Dodd & Supa, 2014), however, some research has found that potential benefits from aligned evaluators were generally small and did not compensate for the costs among the misaligned (Mukherjee & Althuizen, 2020). Furthermore, once a stance has been taken there is little utility in backtracking: apologizing for advocacy after facing public backlash had a negative effect on aligned evaluators' attitudes and no redeeming effect among the misaligned (Mukherjee & Althuizen, 2020). Consistent with the well-known negativity bias, in which negative events have a larger influence on human psychology than positive ones (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001), consumers respond more strongly to brand actions they oppose than to brand actions they support, and thus political actions are more likely to repel existing customers than to attract new ones (Hydock et al., 2020). This insight helped identify one context in which political action is beneficial: when organizations are small and thus have little to lose and a lot to gain (Hydock et al., 2020). Whereas large, established corporations with broad appeal across the political spectrum might suffer from alienating a large number of customers or potential customers by engaging in political action, relatively new, small, and unknown organizations might benefit from the attention such action can generate. However, future research should explore whether short-

term gains come at long-term costs if they lower the upper limit on the possible number of customers or supporters an organization can obtain in the future.

Less is known about how political action affects outcomes for other kinds of organizations and institutions, including public institutions and other civic organizations that serve important societal functions, such as those in the healthcare industry and scientific institutions. However, emerging research suggests that here too political actions and subsequent perceptions that institutions are politicized may have deleterious effects on the institution, as well as broader social costs.

Over the past several years, many organizations and institutions in the U.S. have been losing public trust (e.g., Brady & Kent, 2022; Sherman, 2002; Twenge et al., 2014), including science and tech companies (Doherty & Kiley, 2019; Funk et al., 2022), higher education (Jones, 2015), and media organizations (Brenan, 2022). Sometimes, trust declines correspond specifically to a misalignment in perceived political values. For example, the political left has lost trust toward banks, corporations, and religious organizations, which are perceived as right-leaning (Doherty & Kiley, 2019); whereas the political right has lost trust toward science, higher education, and the media, which are perceived as left-leaning (Doherty & Kiley, 2019; Gauchat, 2012; Jurkowitz et al., 2020; Li & Qian, 2022). With few exceptions, academic disciplines perceived as politically centrist (as opposed to leaning liberal or conservative) tend to be the most trusted (Altenmüller et al., 2024). Recent research suggests that the actual or perceived politicization of institutions—the view that political values influence an organization's or institution's work—may be causing these trust declines among the American public.

In a recent experiment, participants who were randomly assigned to read a real Joe Biden endorsement written by the science journal *Nature* (vs. not in a control condition) reported lower trust not just in the journal *Nature*, but also in scientists in general (Zhang, 2023). Replicating this pattern across a set of 70 organizations, institutions, groups of professionals, and academic disciplines (including, among others, the Supreme Court, Facebook, the World Health Organization, police officers, and psychology professors), perceptions that political values influence an organization's work were associated with lower trust toward those organizations, even among members of the public who saw themselves as ideologically aligned with the organizations they were evaluating (Clark et al., 2023). Similarly, in experimental studies, when an organization or academic professional society took political action by endorsing a political candidate or inviting a political speaker to give a keynote presentation at a conference, participants reported lower trust toward the organization and less willingness to defer to their expertise and to financially support the organization. And again, this pattern emerged even among participants who were in the same political party as the candidate or speaker. Moreover, similar to the Zhang (2023) findings, declines in trust toward one specific organization (e.g., an organization called *Economics Professors of America*) also undermined trust toward broader professional groups (e.g., all economists in general), indicating that the negative consequences of political action can spread well beyond the group responsible for the political action.

This research also uncovered a potential polarizing moderator: organizational relevance of political action. When an organization's social media posts endorsed political positions that were irrelevant to the organization's activities (vs. explicitly relevant), trust gains among ingroup members of the public were higher and trust losses among outgroup members were larger (and these outgroup losses were larger than ingroup gains) in comparison to changes in trust for more relevant posts (Clark et al., 2023).

3 | QUESTIONS ON RISKS

Although political actions may have generally negative effects on trust, deference, and support, these declines are consistently steeper for political outgroup members who see themselves as misaligned with an organization, than for politically-aligned members (Clark et al., 2023), indicating that political action can be both broadly negative and polarizing at the same time. This polarization raises the possibility of potential feedback loops whereby signaling commitment to one political group alienates the outgroup from participating in that organization, making the

organization appear and perhaps *be* more politicized, further escalating polarization regarding which organizations and institutions are trustworthy (e.g., Bermiss & McDonald, 2018; Duarte et al., 2014). Such a possibility further raises the question of whether institutional politicization undermines public coordination and cooperation at key moments, such as during national or global public health crises. These possibilities should be explored in future work.

Future work should also explore whether and how costs differ for commercial organizations compared to government organizations, non-profits, and scientific or academic organizations. Given that historically activist organizations have more positive outcomes when they engage in political action (Wang et al., 2022), activist non-profits may generally benefit from taking organizationally aligned political action. In contrast, scientific and academic organizations and institutions may suffer the most from political action (Clark, 2024). Insofar as academic institutions serve a unique function for the public—the preservation, production, and transmission of knowledge—they may be uniquely expected to adhere to certain rules and norms that limit bias, including political bias, in the pursuit of truth (Rauch, 2021). The credibility of the academy in the eyes of the public may depend on its commitment to these norms. Indeed, the public considers it generally inappropriate for any academic discipline to be influenced by political values (Clark et al., 2023). Moreover, the negative associations between perceived politicization and both lower trust and higher skepticism were the most universal for academic disciplines, such that the politically aligned public were approximately as disapproving of politicization as the politically misaligned (Clark et al., 2023). But future research is needed to better understand whether academic institutions uniquely suffer from taking political actions, and if so, which types of academic organizations fall into this category (e.g., only universities and academic disciplines, or also academic professional societies, scholarly journals, departmental leadership).

An extensive literature has documented that people prefer news media that aligns with their own political perspectives (e.g., Durante & Knight, 2012; Stroud, 2008, 2010) and that media organizations respond to this economic demand by delivering news that slants in the direction of consumer preferences (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2010). Given that media organizations and scientific organizations are both in the “truth” business, it may be informative to compare the costs and benefits of political action for these two types of organizations. Is political action less costly for media organizations than for scientific ones? If so, why? How much does the size and heterogeneity of the media audience matter? And does the type of political action matter? For example, what are the costs and benefits of subtle politicized framing of issues in news stories (e.g., describing an outgroup candidate as “attacking” an opponent, but an ingroup candidate as “critiquing” an opponent) compared to explicit candidate or policy endorsements? And do explicit candidate or policy endorsements have lower costs when communicated in opinions and editorials than when communicated by the newsroom (see e.g., Kahn & Kenney, 2002)? One small study suggests that when newspapers endorse a candidate, it can blowback on the newspaper itself, costing support from those who oppose the candidate, but with no compensatory benefit among those who back the candidate (Burkes, 2017). Still, more research is needed, and future research should explore moderators at the levels of both the type of organization and the type of political action.

Additionally, scholars should compare the relative costs of political action versus silence in the midst of sociopolitical controversies. Statements such as “your silence speaks volumes” or “the silence is deafening” indicate that *not* taking political stances can itself be perceived as a conspicuous political action and could be costly in some cases. Such perceptions seem most likely to occur for organizations with a history of making political statements, setting an expectation that they will do so in the future. Future research should explore the contexts under which silence versus statements produce costs or benefits as well as the relative time trends for these costs and benefits (e.g., when are there short-term costs but long-term benefits or short-term benefits but long-term costs?). This is a nascent research area, and much is unknown about the potential downstream consequences of political action and the likely numerous moderators of those consequences. Figure 1 presents causes of organizational political actions, the consequences of these actions, and moderators of these relationships, including those supported by existing research and those worth testing in future research.




FIGURE 1 Causes of organizational political action, consequences, and moderators.

4 | ON REASONS

Given that political action, on average, appears to impose material and reputational costs on organizations, why do leaders involve their organizations in political matters? At minimum, political action risks alienating the proportion of the public that opposes those political values. But such political actions risk alienating almost the entire public who may prefer organizations “stay in their lane” and stick to their stated objectives (e.g., making high quality sneakers, reporting the news, brewing affordable beer, conducting medical research, supplying online entertainment). Skilled organizational leaders are unlikely to be oblivious to these risks, yet it has become increasingly common for organizations to take sociopolitical stances (e.g., Chatterji & Toffel, 2018; Lin, 2022; Phillips, 2023; Soergel, 2016). A review of the research reveals a handful of plausible explanations as to why organizational leaders take political stances. Some of these involve complicated trade-offs between long-term and short-term goals, but other explanations raise questions about whether these reasons are based on misunderstandings of public preferences.

In the literature, organizational political action is often attributed to “social pressure” from various stakeholders, especially from customers and/or the public desiring or demanding that businesses “take a stand” (Bravo & Lee, 2019; Coombs & Holladay, 2018; Gaines-Ross, 2017; Hydock et al., 2020; Schmidt et al., 2021; van der Meer & Jonkman, 2021). Consistent with this attribution, leaders report that various stakeholders, including higher up leaders, shareholders, and the public can exert pressure on them to take political action (Clark et al., 2024). But there is reason to believe leaders are somewhat miscalibrated in their expectations about how political action will influence political ingroup members. Although leaders expected mostly negative organizational consequences in response to their taking political action (including reduced profits and productivity and damage to their professional reputation), they also tended to believe that political action would increase organizational support among members of the public who supported the political perspective (Clark et al., 2024). The findings reviewed above suggest this may not be the likely response.

Even if we ignore the social costs imposed on politicized organizations, the evidence on whether the public actually wants businesses to “take a stand” on political issues is mixed. For example, Sprout Social (2017) reported that 70% of consumers believe it is important for brands to take public stances on social and political issues, whereas Morning Consult (2023) found that only 27% of Americans felt companies should play an active role in communicating their position on social and political issues with another 40% supporting political involvement only when the issue directly related to their business. Similarly, a Gallup poll reported that Americans were nearly split down the middle with 48% of people agreeing businesses should take public stances on political and social issues

and 52% saying they should not (Marken, 2023). Based on these results, some groups advise businesses to take a stand on sociopolitical issues (Edelman, 2018; Morning Consult, 2023; Sprout Social, 2017), but even if a vast majority of consumers want organizations to take political stances, doing so could still be costly on average.

Members of the public who want organizations to take political stances want them to support *their own* values and will support and boycott based on organizational alignment with their idiosyncratic views (Bounfantino, 2022; Edelman, 2018). Even if 70% of people want an organization to take a stand on a particular political issue, because political issues are by their nature divisive, a subset of that 70% will desire one side on the issue and another subset may boycott if the organization takes that side. Furthermore, even if most members of the public support both a particular issue and a particular side on that issue, they may still disagree with how or where the political action was taken, such as when organizations support a popular social cause but do so in a way considered “tone deaf” and subsequently lose support.

To illustrate this possibility, we conducted a survey of 402 census-matched U.S. adults. Precise methods, results, and verbatim survey materials can be found in the Supplement on our OSF page, along with our data and syntax. In a question adapted from Gallup (Marken, 2023) and Sprout Social (2017), only 36.8% of participants supported businesses taking public stances on social and political issues in *general*. However, we did see higher levels of support for public stances regarding Climate Change (63.7%) and Healthcare Policy (52.5%), and even small to moderate majorities supported particular positions to combat climate change (71.5%) and in support of universal healthcare (56.4%). Nonetheless, majorities opposed businesses taking public stances across all possible platforms, with the highest levels of support for public stances on social media (39.1%) and websites and blogs (41.3%) and the lowest levels for customer communications such as emails (23.9%). These findings suggest that even if an organization supported a popular political stance, they might present it in a way that most people consider inappropriate. For example, although the majority of participants supported public stances to combat climate change and to support universal healthcare, only 34.0% and 35.1% (respectively) supported businesses taking such stances on social media.

For another illustrative example, although 45.8% of participants supported businesses taking public stances on free speech, these numbers dropped to ~32% when a particular position was specified, and then to ~19%–26% if we selected those who endorsed public stances on social media. As illustrated in Figure 2 below, if we look across the total sample, even though 45.8% of participants supported stances on free speech, when asked whether businesses should take a stance supporting unrestricted free speech, the majority said no, and when asked whether businesses should take a stance advocating for limitations on free speech, the majority said no. Consequently, in the entire sample, 21.1% supported businesses taking public stances in favor of unrestricted free speech, 19.9% supported businesses taking public stances advocating for limitations on free speech, whereas 59% did not support one of these two stances. Although we did not directly test this possibility, it seems plausible that individuals who want an organization to publicly endorse “Position A,” might be even more irked by that organization endorsing “Position Not A” compared to that organization taking no position at all and compared to those who do not want organizations taking political positions at all. Thus members of the public who desire organizations to “take a stand” may be likelier to have stronger reactions to political action, but not always more favorable strong reactions.

This survey also revealed one additional important consideration: supporters of sociopolitical action tended to be high in ideosuperiority, or the belief that their own political values are the only right values to hold and were particularly likely to boycott businesses for political reasons. In other words, the very same people who desire or demand that organizations take political stances are also the most likely to punish them if they do it wrong. These findings suggest an additional risk of even successful political campaigns: they could lead to the accumulation of customers, supporters, or audience members who are especially politically zealous and perhaps likelier to protest and boycott for any future political missteps. Thus it seems that reports that the majority of the public wants organizations to take political stances miss important nuance and may be misleading leaders into making risky political maneuvers. Public demands to “take a stand” might seem like one unified call to action, but they may instead be a large set of demands that often directly conflict with one another. Many landmines, little gold.




FIGURE 2 Combinations of responses from those who did or did not support free speech stances to those who did or did not support free speech stances regarding limitations on free speech or unrestricted free speech.

External pressure, however, is almost certainly not the only reason leaders get their organizations involved in political conflicts. Although institutions and organizations often have very specific goals, they are run by individual humans or groups of humans, who each have their own goals and motivations. In particular, humans are desirous of climbing social hierarchies within peer groups (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Tooby & Cosmides, 2010). In modern western societies, political groups are often an important social group, and people engage in a variety of behaviors to signal their commitments and coalitional value to their political ingroups (Clark et al., 2019; Clark & Winegard, 2020; Pietraszewski et al., 2015). Consequently, organizational leaders might be tempted to use the authority and influence of the organizations they lead to benefit their political ingroup in order to increase their own status. The Iron Law of Institutions proposes that leaders prioritize their own status and power within their institution over the success of the institution itself (Schwarz, 2007). To our knowledge, this plausible hypothesis has not yet been carefully studied, however, some findings are at least consistent with the Iron Law. For example, many cases of organizational political action involve purposefully conspicuous public statements made by CEOs or others in leadership (Hambrick & Wowak, 2021). This could be explained by a company's strategy to communicate their position with maximal visibility and authority (although political activism announced by CEOs may be *more* financially costly (Bhagwat et al., 2020)). But this could also be explained by leaders wanting their own identities associated with particular political positions. Indeed, some scholars have posited that leaders' power, celebrity, and narcissism are likely associated with greater likelihood of taking political action (Hambrick & Wowak, 2021). A recent study of over 400 organizational leaders in the U.S. found that nearly 90% of organizational leaders claimed that they have not and would not get their organization involved in political affairs, but that leaders high in ideocentrism—the belief that all others share their own ideological preferences—were more likely to endorse organizational political action (Clark et al., 2024). These findings suggest that leaders who believe their own views are popular (and thus perhaps capable of gaining them popularity) are more likely to take organizational political action. Identifying the characteristics of leaders who take political action would be a fruitful research area for personality psychologists.

These ideocentrism findings also raise a third possible explanation for why leaders take political action: naïve realism and false consensus regarding the leader's political values (Ross et al., 1977; Ross & Ward, 1996). Leaders

may view their political values not as political at all, but instead as panhuman values that most people share. This would also explain why the vast majority of leaders report that they have not and would not take political stances as part of their organization (Clark et al., 2024; Hydock et al., 2020), yet scholars and journalists find such political stances increasingly common (e.g., Chatterji & Toffel, 2018; Lin, 2022; Phillips, 2023; Soergel, 2016), and the public frequently perceive organizational decision making as politically motivated (e.g., Barnidge et al., 2020). When leaders take politically relevant action, third parties might view those actions as political, whereas the leaders themselves may perceive those actions as apolitical. Just as people seem incapable of perceiving their own biases (Pronin et al., 2002), they may also be incapable of perceiving when their actions or statements are infused with divisive political values. Future research should explore whether leaders and the public agree on what counts as “political action” to test this possibility.

5 | QUESTIONS ON REASONS

There are numerous other possible reasons why leaders might take political stances, such as financial incentives from political groups, sincere desire to support meaningful political causes, or belief (false or not) that political action will benefit the long-term flourishing of the organization. Increased polarization and heightened social visibility of organizations (e.g., on social media) may have created the impression that neutrality or refusal to “take a stand” is no longer a viable option (e.g., van der Meer & Jonkman, 2021). The explanations explored here are not mutually exclusive, and many or all of them may be true to varying degrees in different cases. Given the clear risks associated with political action, it seems likely that organizational leaders perceive benefits that outweigh the risks. Future research should explore what leaders perceive as the benefits and test how well leaders are able to forecast the costs and benefits of political action (e.g., Schoemaker & Tetlock, 2016). In some cases, leaders may simply be ignorant of the risks.

Even if organizational political action tends to have negative consequences for organizations, it may have positive personal consequences for the leaders issuing such stances or for the political position such actions aim to support. Here, we primarily considered organizational outcomes, but future research should also consider costs and benefits for the relevant people and political causes and the extent to which leaders consider those consequences in organizational decision making. More broadly, as research accumulates regarding (1) the contexts under which leaders take political action and (2) the moderators of the consequences, scholars should work toward establishing theories of organizational politicization that consider decision making at both the individual and organizational level.

Additionally, much of the research reviewed here was conducted in the United States, which not only has a unique and highly polarized political culture but may also have unique expectations regarding the responsibilities and obligations of public and private organizations. Future research should explore these relationships in other cultural contexts, including those with different political and economic systems.

6 | CONCLUSION

The current state of the science suggests that organizational political action has generally adverse consequences for organizations (including financial and reputational). Similarly, when institutions that perform important societal functions (such as science and academic disciplines) are perceived as permitting political values to influence their work, the public trusts and supports them less. Although there are many known moderators of these costs and likely many more moderators yet to be discovered, the general negative trend raises critical questions regarding why organizational leaders publicly take sides in ongoing sociopolitical controversies. Widespread claims that the public and consumers desire organizations to “take a stand” are likely overly simplistic and may misguide leaders

regarding the true costs and benefits of political action. We hope this review will inspire much needed research aiming to better understand organizational leaders' reasons for signaling political values and the contexts under which it is advantageous to do so.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

CI is grateful to the Institute for Humane Studies for their support (grant no. IHS018154). AS acknowledges a Canada 150 Research Chair grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. CC acknowledges Templeton World Charity Foundation and the Institute for Humane Studies.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are openly available in Open Science Framework at <https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/G5NFQ>.

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How to cite this article: Clark, C. J., Isch, C., & Shariff, A. (2024). Why do organizations take political stances? A review of reasons and risks. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, e12985. <https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12985>